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A considerable amount of theoretical work, based on disparate modeling approaches,
supports the notion that allocative eﬃciency in a monetary economy hinges on a deter-
ministic deﬂationary policy, known as the ‘Friedman rule.’2 The result revolves around
the idea that if impatient agents must do business with money and must hold cash in
their portfolios, then deﬂation is socially desirable as it lessens the (opportunity) cost of
holding cash.
In this theoretical literature, interest-bearing asset trades do not seem to play an es-
sential role in policy execution; lump-sum transfers do the trick. Yet, in practice monetary
interventions take the form of open market operations in which cash trades for less liquid
interest-bearing government assets. Agents buy bonds when they have excess liquidity,
and sell them as the need for transactions balances arises. We attempt to reconcile these
observations with the theory, posing the following questions. Does the Friedman rule al-
ways lead to a ﬁrst best? If, not what is the reason and would government liabilities other
than money help improve the allocation? If so, should these assets be illiquid? Clearly,
the answers hinge on the speciﬁcation of the economic environment.
We work with a spatially separated model (as in Townsend, 1980) where money has a
fundamental allocative role. Agents face random consumption needs but–due to carefully
speciﬁed environmental frictions (as in Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello, 2004)–are phys-
ically prevented from lending or borrowing from each other and from sharing information
over time. Thus, trade must be monetized and a sudden consumption shock generates an
immediate need for cash. Further, we draw from the two-market formulation of Lagos and
Wright (2002) to achieve degeneracy in asset holdings and–as suggested by Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2003)–we work under the assumption of competitive markets.
Two features set apart this model from these related monetary frameworks. First,
agents need not rely exclusively on cash to insure against consumption shocks. They can
also acquire government nominal bonds, and liquidate them for cash before maturity if a
consumption need arises. Second, the model accounts for the possibility of a natural form
of heterogeneity in that agents diﬀer in their rate of time preference and in their exposure
to consumption risk.
We prove two results. First, we demonstrate that deterministic deﬂations under zero
interest rates–that is under the Friedman rule–cannot sustain the stationary eﬃcient
allocation. The reason is, under zero interest rates, agents insure against consumption
2E.g. the spatial economy of Townsend (1980) or Williamson (2004), money in the utility function or
transaction costs models (Chari et al.,1996), the search models of Shi (1997) or Lagos and Wright (2003).
1shocks with cash. Unfortunately, a deﬂationary policy that gives cash the return desired
by the most impatient agents leaves the door open to arbitrage opportunities for everyone
else. This constrains the equilibrium deﬂation to the lowest discount rate–much as in
Becker (1980)–so that impatient agents will tend to under-insure.
Interestingly, if bonds pay no interest (equivalently, if money is the only asset avail-
able), then in equilibrium every agent holds positive cash balances. This is unlike Becker–
where the most patient agents hold the entire stock of assets (capital)–because money
in our model is essential to execute trades. Of course, the more impatient hold less of
it, which is detrimental to trading eﬃciency. This result appears to be quite general and
should hold in any environment with heterogeneity in discounting where money has an
explicit medium-of-exchange role.
Then, we show that the eﬃcient allocation can be sustained when bonds pay a positive
yield but–under certain conditions–only if bonds are suﬃciently illiquid. That is to say,
only if bonds cannot be transformed into consumption as quickly and eﬃciently as cash.
If the government prices bonds correctly, agents fully insure against consumption shocks
by holding illiquid bonds that are sold for cash once a consumption need arises. In short,
we need a friction (illiquidity) to cure an ineﬃciency, much as in Kocherlakota (2001).
When is illiquidity a necessary friction? When the most patient agents are also those
who experience the greatest incidence of consumption shocks. Illiquidity acts as a propor-
tional tax that lowers the bond’s expected return according to the anticipated incidence of
consumption shocks. Thus, illiquidity aﬀects the bonds’ expected return unequally across
agent types. By selecting appropriate bond yield and illiquidity parameters, the policy-
maker can therefore manipulate the rates of return in order to induce agents to perfectly
insure against consumption risk while removing possible arbitrage opportunities.
2R e l a t e dL i t e r a t u r e
Our work complements the literature concerned with the optimality of the Friedman
rule. Among such papers is Faig (1988) who ﬁnds that the Friedman rule is optimal in
a shopping-time model where money reduces transactions costs. Freeman (1993) con-
ﬁrms this result for a model of inﬁnitely lived agents deriving utility from holding real
balances. However, in overlapping generation models with dynastic preferences and no
intergenerational transfers, the Friedman rule is optimal only if bequests are positive.
Zero nominal rates are also optimal in Williamson’s (1996) cash-in-advance, sequential
markets model, unless there are money demand (preference) shocks. In that case beneﬁts
arise from an accommodating monetary stance so the Friedman rule can be suboptimal. In
2Paal and Smith’s (2000) growth model shocks to agents’ “liquidity preferences” create an
insurance role for banks. At high nominal interest rates banks economize on reserves and
provide less liquidity, while at low rate they hold higher reserves but fund little investment
in capital. The trade-oﬀ between liquidity provision against higher growth implies that
the Friedman rule is suboptimal when the maximal rate of real growth it can sustain is at
or below the real interest rate. Random preferences over future consumption also imply
suboptimality of the Friedman rule in Berentsen and Strub (2004).
Phelps (1973) argues against deﬂationary policies from a pure optimal taxation per-
spective, noting that the Friedman rule leads to increasing other (more distortionary)
taxes, to replace the lost revenue. This contrasts with Kimbrough’s (1986) ﬁnding that
the Friedman rule is optimal even under distortionary taxes since–he argues–money is
an intermediate good and as such it should not be taxed.
da Costa and Werning (2003) also suggest the Friedman rule can be optimal under dis-
tortionary taxation. So do Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), in a cash-credit model,
a money-in-the-utility-function model and a shopping time model. Their conclusion is
conﬁrmed by Correia and Tales (1996)–given distortionary taxes–but is questioned by
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) who argue that some assumptions in Chari et al (1996)
are not based on micro-founded theories of money demand, and give examples that over-
turn their results. In addition, they conduct an empirical analysis suggesting that in the
U.S. the optimal inﬂation rate is small, but positive.
We, too, consider diﬀerent nominal interest rules but–despite having non-distortionary
taxes–a deﬂationary policy is not a ﬁrst best in our model. However, it unambiguously
generates beneﬁcial eﬀects. In short, the Friedman rule is always a second best.
Our paper contributes also to research concerned with the allocative role of government-
supplied illiquid assets. For instance, Woodford (1990) shows that government borrowing
has beneﬁcial eﬀects, for example it smooths endowment ﬂuctuations, when some face
illiquidity problems (borrowing constraints). Kocherlakota (2001) argues that govern-
ment illiquid bonds are essential, when unobservable preferences hinder a more eﬃcient
allocation of consumption. Such bonds allow cash transfers from agents with less to more
pressing consumption needs. Shi (2003), studies how interest rates and output depend on
bonds’ endogenous illiquidity (the fraction of unmatured bonds held by buyers). He ﬁnds
that illiquid bonds can yield higher welfare and higher nominal interest rates.
We too motivate disparities in desired cash holdings via unequal preferences. However,
we have no search but competitive markets, unlike Shi; unlike Kocherlakota, private
information does not play a role and the Friedman rule is suboptimal. Our notion of
3illiquidity also diﬀers, as in our model bonds cannot be directly exchanged for goods but
can be readily cashed in, at a cost.
3 The Model
We consider a discrete-time production economy with a unit continuum of heteroge-
neous inﬁnitely-lived agents. They are subject to idiosyncratic trading risk and participate
in an inﬁnite sequence of markets characterized by spatial separation and enforcement lim-
itations. We adopt these modeling features as they generate an explicit transactions role
for currency. However, they also generate complicated history-dependent distributions of
assets (e.g. Camera and Corbae, 1999). To ease these complications, we specify a phys-
ical environment based on the meeting technology formalized in Aliprantis, Camera and
Puzzello (2004), and we draw from the trading and preference formulation of Lagos and
Wright (2003).
3.1 Physical Environment
The physical environment is in the tradition of Townsend (1980). It has features that
preclude borrowing and lending among agents, while giving an explicit role to money in
facilitating spot exchange.
At each date countably many trading groups are formed (think of these as islands).
Each group consists of an identically large number of agents, with an identical proportion
of agent types. Trading groups are spatially and informationally separated in that an
agent can only interact and communicate with his current groupmates. Everyone is in
some trading group at any point in time, but obstacles to the ﬂow of information and
resources preclude borrowing/lending among agents. Precisely, agents stay in the same
trading group only once and move across groups in a way that severs all possible direct
and indirect links among traders. Especially, any two agents meet only once and their
histories evolve in such a way that the members of any trading group are anonymous.
That such a theoretical construct exists, is proved in Aliprantis et al. (2004).
As in Lagos and Wright (2003), two goods markets open and close sequentially on
each island, at each date. As in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2003), the markets are
competitive. A diﬀerent perishable good can be produced on each market, a specialty good
in market one, and a general good in the other. Also, the ﬁr s tm a r k e ti sc h a r a c t e r i z e db y
idiosyncratic trading risk, while the second is not. Speciﬁcally, we assume two types of
agents j = H,L in proportion ρ and 1 − ρ. These agents diﬀer as follows. The discount
factors βj satisfy 0 < βL < βH < 1 and the probabilities αj that a type j trades in the ﬁrst
market satisfy 0 < αL < αH ≤ 1. These trading shocks are drawn at the beginning of each
4period. Once on market one, consumption and production are equally likely and mutually
exclusive, so a trader either desires the good or can produce it; this generates idiosyncratic
consumption risk. In short, the more patient agents are more actively involved in trade
but are also more actively exposed to consumption risk.
As soon as the ﬁrst market closes, the second market opens in which everyone partic-
ipates by producing and consuming. Thus, while only ραH +(1−ρ)αL of the population
trades in market one, everyone trades in the second market, and there is always an equal
number of buyers and sellers in each market. Hence, there is no aggregate trading risk. As
in Lagos and Wright (2003), it is assumed that those who desire a specialty good derive
utility u(c) from c ≥ 0 consumption, while producers of cs ≥ 0 specialty goods suﬀer disu-
tility −cs. Agents derive utility U(q)−qs from q ≥ 0 consumption and qs ≥ 0 production
of the general good. The functions u and U satisfy the standard Inada conditions and
u(0) = U (0) = 0. Also, let c∗ be the solution to u (c)=1and let q∗ be the solution to
u (q)=1 .
3.2 Assets and the Government
Given the structure of the model, specialty goods trade must be monetized. We assume
a government is the sole supplier of ﬁat currency available in the amount Mt > 0 at the
beginning of date t. We let Mt = πMt−1 be the deterministic law of motion of the money
stock. As in Lucas (1980), we assume lump-sum cash transfers/taxes, denoted Tt,t ok e e p
the announced rate of growth constant. These occur in the second market so Mt cash is
a v a i l a b l ei nm a r k e tt w oo fp e r i o dt − 1.
The government also buys and sells one-period nominal bonds having two distinctive
features (similar to U.S. Savings bonds). First, they are non-negotiable claims to currency;
bonds cannot be directly exchanged for goods and can be redeemed only by their owner.
To formalize it, assume bonds are intangible (hence non-transferable) assets, ownership of
which is recorded by the government. Of course, the government can credibly commit to
repayment, as it can print currency. Second, bonds are illiquid in that early redemption
may come at a cost and cannot involve fractions of the asset. Speciﬁcally, bonds are
issued in market two at price pA ≤ 1 and mature the following period (in market two)
paying oﬀ one unit of money. Unmatured bonds can be redeemed for p  ≤ 1 money by
traders in market one. Hence, p  naturally captures the notion of illiquidity a st h ec o s to f
immediate execution of a trade: 1 − p  is lost to convert a bond into immediate cash, at
the beginning of a period.
4 Stationary Monetary Allocations
5We start by indicating the timing of events in any period t for an agent type j. He
enters t with portfolio Ωj,t =( Mj,t,A j,t) listing non-negative amounts of money and bonds
bought with cash in market two of t − 1. Then, the trading shock is realized, denoted
k = n,s,b, i.e., n if he cannot trade and b or s if he can buy or sell. If he trades in market
one he can choose to liquidate his bonds. As soon as market one closes, the agent enters
market two with portfolio Ωk,j,t =( Mk,j,t,A k,j,t).
We denote pi,t the price of goods in market i =1 ,2. I nm a r k e to n ew ed e n o t ecj,t the
consumption of a buyer of type j, and denote ct the production of any seller. In market
two, qt denotes consumption of any buyer, and qk,t production of those who experienced
shock k.3 Of course, liquidation of bonds is desirable only if cash is needed to consume
in market one. Thus, without loss in generality we let
Ab,j,t ∈ {0,A j,t} and As,j,t = An,j,t = Aj,t (1)
Mb,j,t = Mj,t + p (Aj,t − Ab,j,t) − p1,tcj,t,M s,j,t = Mj,t + p1,tct,M n,j,t = Mj,t. (2)
In what follows, we focus on stationary monetary outcomes in which consumption of
a buyer is time-invariant and money has constant positive value. In doing so we use the
price in market two, p2,t, as our reference price (this is without loss in generality, as we
later prove). Since market one consumption depends on the size and composition of the













At the end of t − 1 aggregate nominal savings must equal the amount of cash available,
i.e.,
ρ(MH,t + pAAH,t)+( 1− ρ)(ML,t + pAAL,t)=Mt
so that in a stationary equilibrium aggregate real balances are time-invariant and inﬂation













3Later it will be evident this notation is not restrictive. Sellers have identical and linear cost functions,
so they produce the same quantity in market one. Since portfolios can be heterogeneous across types
and buyers cannot produce, consumption may diﬀer by type in market one. In market two everyone can
produce so consumption is identical across types, and production heterogeneity in equilibrium will only
correspond to heterogeneity in wealth (from idiosyncratic trading schocks) but not diﬀerences in type.
6Since Mt = Mt−1π,t h e n{Tt} must be such that
Mt−1π = Tt + ρ
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That is, to sustain the deterministic money growth rate π, the per-capita money transfer
in market two must equal the desired end-of-period cash supply, Mt−1π, minus the cash
available at the beginning of market two. The latter includes initial money balances Mj,t
and money associated to the redemption of bonds in market one or two, Aj,t −
αj
2 (1 −
p )(Aj,t−Ab,j,t). Thus, {Tt}
∞
t=1 is generally not a constant sequence, although it is perfectly
announced since it is based on the asset holdings at the beginning of the period.
In what follows we work with real variables using p2,t as a normalizing factor, denoting
¯ mt = Mt
p2,t, ωj,t =
Ωj,t
p2,t ,m k,j,t =
Mk,j,t
p2,t ,a b,j,t =
Ab,j,t
p2,t , τt = Tt
p2,t and pt =
p1,t
p2,t.
To simplify notation, we omit time subscripts and use ‘ ’ to denote next-period variables.
Hence, real balances (2), at any date t,a r e
mb,j = mj + p (aj − ab,j) − pcj
ms,j = mj + pc
mn,j = mj.
(5)
We are now ready to study the stationary equilibria. In this framework agents choose
actions in order to maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility from consumption
of goods in market one and two. Thus, given the recursive nature of the problem we can
use a dynamic programming approach to describe the problem faced by a representative
agent of type j at any date. We will let Vj(ωj) be the expected lifetime utility of this
agent when he starts the period with ωj, before trading shocks are realized. Let Wj(ωk,j)
be the expected lifetime utility from entering market two with ωk,j.
4.1 The second market
We use a functional equation to formalize the agent’s problem at the start of market
two. Speciﬁcally,
Wj(ωk,j)= m a x
q,qk,ω 
j≥0
{U(q) − qk + βjVj(ω 
j)}
subject to the real resource constraint
q + π(m 
j + pAa 
j)=qk + mk,j + ak,j + τ. (6)
7The constrain holds with equality due to non-satiation. The resources available to the
agent partly depend on the realization of the trading shock k,a sh eh a smk,j real balances
carried over from market one, and ak,j receipts from matured bonds. Other resources
are qk non-negative receipts from current sales of general goods and the lump-sum real-
balances transfer τ. These resources can be used to ﬁnance current consumption q, to buy
a 
j bonds at price pA, or simply to carry m 
j real money balances into tomorrow’s markets
(short-selling is not allowed). Of course, the variable π multiplies a 
j and m 
j since these
are nominal assets and nominal prices can vary across dates.
Indeed, the composition of savings will depend on the expected rates of return on cash
and bonds. We emphasize that agents can save only with money or bonds and cannot lend
to each other (in particular, the most patient cannot lend to the less patient) because the
structure of the environment severs all future (direct and indirect) links among current
trade partners.
Rewriting (6) as
qk = q + π(m 
j + pAa 
j) − (mk,j + ak,j + τ)
and conjecturing qk ≥ 0,t h e nw eh a v e 4
Wj(ωk,j)= m a x
q,ω 
j≥0
{U(q) − q − π(m 
j + pAa 
j)+mk,j + ak,j + τ + βjVj(ω 
j)}. (7)
A ﬁrst important result emerges.






=1 for j = H,L (8)
The result hinges on the linearity of production disutility in market two and the use
of competitive pricing (linear in the quantity sold). Since goods are sold for cash it
follows that the marginal value of any asset in equilibrium must simply reﬂect the price of
real balances, which is one. The economic implication is the marginal valuations of real
balances and bonds in market two are identical and–most importantly–do not hinge on
the agent’s type, wealth ωk,j or trade shock k.
In short, this model allows us to disentangle the agents’ portfolio choices from their
trading histories since
Wj(ωk,j)= Wj(0) + mk,j + ak,j (9)
4Of course we must verify that qk ≥ 0 for all k in equilibrium. Note also that real balance transfers or
taxes, τ, must also be time-invariant in a stationary equilibrium.
8i.e. the agent’s expected value from having ωk,j at the start of market two is the expected
value Wj(0) from having no wealth (letting ωj =( 0 ,0) ≡ 0) plus the current real value
of wealth mk,j +ak,j. This implies agents of identical type exit market two with identical
portfolios ω 
j, independent of their trading histories–much as in Lagos and Wright (2003).
However, diﬀerent types might choose diﬀerent portfolios, as we demonstrate next.
Start by observing that by (7) we have q = q∗. That is, under the conjecture qk ≥
0, then everyone can consume the same amount q∗ in market two, independent of his
asset holdings. The reason is agents in market two can produce any amount at constant
marginal cost. Thus we have










The central implication is the agents’ lifetime utility–and the eﬃciency of the decen-
tralized monetary solution–will hinge on the trades that take place in market one. Since
these depend on the availability of suﬃcient–and suﬃciently liquid–ﬁnancial resources,




j ≥ 0 and λm
j ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers on desired real
































(= if m 
j > 0)
(= if a 
j > 0).
(10)
Recalling that one unit of real balances buys one unit of consumption, the left hand side of
the expressions simply deﬁne the marginal cost of assets. The right hand sides deﬁne the
expected marginal beneﬁt from holding the asset–money or bonds–discounted according
to time-preferences and inﬂation. The weak inequalities reﬂect an obvious no-arbitrage
requirement: the beneﬁt from buying any asset cannot surpass its cost.
At this point it is important to realize that an asset’s expected value hinges on the
asset’s yield but also on its illiquidity, i.e. the loss from converting it into immediate cash.
This is why bonds’ returns must be discounted by pA (second line), while money is not
(ﬁrst line). Since agents diﬀer in their frequency of consumption shocks, it follows that
the expected beneﬁt of holding any asset will generally diﬀer across types. To see how,
we must study market one.
4.2 The ﬁrst market
9The expected lifetime utility of agent j who enters a period with ωj must satisfy




2 [−c + Wj(ωs,j)]} +( 1− αj)Wj(ωn,j)
(11)
where as a buyer, he is subject to the real resource constraint
pcj ≤ mj + p (aj − ab,j).
The agent maximizes his expected lifetime utility by choosing consumption of specialty
goods cj ≥ 0 (as a buyer) or production c ≥ 0 (as a seller). Traders can also choose to
liquidate their bonds, which of course is a relevant choice for buyers. Thus, consumption
cj hinges on the relative price across markets, p, and on the available liquidity in the
form of real money balances mj and bonds having liquidation value p aj. As bonds must
be liquidated in their entirety, liquidation corresponds to ab,j =0(ab,j = aj otherwise).
Clearly, wealthy buyers need not be constrained in their consumption, hence the weak
inequality.
We start by determining the equilibrium relative price p =
p1
p2. To do so, we study a
seller’s choice c to maximize his net continuation payoﬀ, i.e.
max
c −c + Wj(ωs,j).






=0 ⇒− 1+p =0
where the implication follows from (5) and (8).
Result 2. In a monetary equilibrium
p =1 . (12)
Why do we have a unit equilibrium relative price p? Recall that sellers are perfectly
able to substitute market one for market two consumption. A sale in market one at price
p1 increases the cash that can be spent at price p2 in market two. Thus, in equilibrium
there cannot be arbitrage opportunities,
p1
p2 =1 . Were
p1
p2 > 1, then a market one seller
would produce inﬁnite amounts, as production generates constant (unit) marginal costs.
No sale would take place if
p1
p2 < 1.T h u sp =1 , an equilibrium condition we substitute
in every expression that follows.
10Now consider a buyer. Given some choice ab,j, he selects non-negative consumption




s.t. cj ≤ mj + p (aj − ab,j)
Let λj ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (where p =1 ) .S i n c e







− λj =0 .
Since
∂Wb,j
∂mb,j =1by (8) and
∂mb,j
∂cj = −p by (5), then the ﬁrst order condition is
u (cj)=1+λj. (13)
Clearly, if λj =0then cj = c∗,s i n c eu (cj)=1 .O t h e r w i s e , cj <c ∗. In short, it is
individually optimal to consume cj ≤ c∗,t h u s
cj =m i n ( mj + p (aj − ab,j),c ∗). (14)
If we deﬁne m∗ = c∗, then liquidating bonds might make sense only if mj <m ∗.H e n c e ,
we say buyer j is liquidity constrained if mj +p (aj −ab,j) <m ∗. Liquidation and savings
are studied next.
4.3 The Marginal Value of Money and Bonds
To ﬁnd the optimal portfolio of an agent, we must calculate the expected marginal




∂aj .T od os ou s e( 5 )a n d( 9 )i nVj(ωj) to obtain
Vj(ωj)= mj + aj +
αj
2 [u(cj) − cj − (aj − ab,j)(1 − p )] + Wj(0) (15)
where cj satisﬁes (14).
Expression (15) tells us that the expected lifetime utility at the start of a period
depends on the agent’s real wealth mj + aj and two additional elements. First, the
expected utility from trade in market one. With probability αj/2 the agent spends cj of
his wealth on consumption and gets net utility u(cj) − cj. If the agent liquidates bonds
we have ab,j =0and we must account for the capital loss aj(1−p ). Second, there is the
continuation payoﬀ Wj(0).
11Equation (15) is useful as it makes it obvious that cj = c∗ is individually optimal
because it maximizes the agent’s net utility in market one. Additionally, it makes it









∂mj =1if the agent is liquidity constrained and zero otherwise (from (14)). It







2 [1 − u (cj)] if mj + p (aj − ab,j) <m ∗
1 otherwise.
(16)












2 (1 − p )(1 −
∂ab,j
∂aj )
so the bond’s marginal value depends on what the agent does with it. If it is used to ﬁnance
market one consumption, then
∂cj







∂aj = p .O t h e r w i s e ,




∂aj =0 . In short, Vj(ωj) is strictly concave in aj if a buyer









2 [1 − p u (cj)] if ab,j =0 and mj + p aj <m ∗
1 −
αj
2 (1 − p ) if ab,j =0 and mj + p aj ≥ m∗
1 if ab,j = aj.
(17)
The expression indicates that the bond’s marginal value always reﬂects the price of
real balances (which is one). If bonds are liquidated to ﬁnance consumption (ﬁrst line)
this value is adjusted by −
αj
2 [1 − p u (cj)]. This is the expected gain or loss from having
p  additional cash ready to spend. This term is likely to be positive when cash constraints
are severe (i.e., cj is small), as there is a large marginal beneﬁt from cashing bonds to buy
consumption. Of course, if the agent is not liquidity constrained (second line), the early
cashing of bonds generates a capital loss −(1 − p ) and no beneﬁt. This loss is absent if
bonds are not liquidated (third line).
Thus, the central observation is that illiquid bonds will be valued dissimilarly across
agent types, primarily due to their heterogeneity in consumption risk, governed by αj.
12In equilibrium, this induces heterogeneity in the returns expected by the diﬀerent agent
types, as we demonstrate next.
4 . 4Y i e l d sa n dR a t e so fR e t u r n
Start by considering gross nominal yields (for real, deﬂate by π). That on money is one
while that on bonds is 1+i = 1
pA, and they are both deterministic. Now consider nominal
rates of return. Abstract from marginal consumption utility, for the moment. Then,
the return on money is deterministic (it is the yield) and the return on illiquid bonds is
deterministic only if they are held until maturity. Due to capital losses, early redemption





Of course, if assets ﬁnance market one consumption we must account for marginal con-
sumption utility. Using (3), (10) and (16)-(17), the agents’ portfolio choices in equilibrium







2 [u (cj) − 1]
 







2 [p u (cj) − 1]
 
(= if aj > 0 and ab,j =0 )
1 ≥
βj
πpA (= if aj > 0 and ab,j = aj)
(18)
with discounted real expected returns on the right hand sides and unit price on the left.
The ﬁrst line refers to the choice of real balances, the second and the third lines refer to
the choice of bonds under early liquidation or not. The ﬁrst line tells us that, in choosing
how many real balances to hold, the agent evaluates three components. The ﬁrst and
the second are standard: the discount factor βj a n dt h er e a ly i e l do nc a s h 1
π.T h et h i r d
component–which is non-standard–is 1
π
αj
2 [u (cj)−1], non-negative since u (cj) ≥ 1 (from
(14)). It can be interpreted as the expected liquidity ‘premium’ from having cash available
in market one; it arises because money is needed to conduct trades in that market. This
premium is the larger the more severe is the cash constraint (the smaller is cj) and the
higher is the likelihood of a consumption shock (the higher is αj).
A similar interpretation applies to the choice of bonds, but there are two key diﬀer-
ences. First, bonds promise a (possibly) higher real yield 1
πpA. Second, a dollar worth of
bonds has a smaller liquidity premium p u (cj) − 1, relative to a dollar worth of cash, if
bonds are illiquid. It is this trade-oﬀ between bonds’ illiquidity and superior return that
will inform the agent’s portfolio decision and the eﬃciency of equilibrium.
We can now present the following
Deﬁnition. Given {π,τ,p A,p  }, a stationary monetary equilibrium is a time-invariant list
13of consumption, production, real asset holdings, and relative prices {cj,c,q,q k,m j,a j,p}
that satisfy (1) through (18).
At this point, some observations are in order. To start, unlike other models of money
our agents are not forced to insure against consumption shocks solely with money. They
can also (or solely) insure with bonds, liquidating them in market one. In any event,
recalling that it is individually optimal to consume cj ≤ c∗, the expressions in (18) make
it evident that bonds are not sold early unless the agent is cash constrained. Hence,
mj + p aj ≤ m∗ in an equilibrium with constrained buyers.
Of course, the portfolio composition depends on the interest rate (e.g. bonds are not
superior to money if pA =1 )but also on the inﬂation rate and the bonds’ illiquidity. The
ﬁrst two policy parameters, pA and π, aﬀect returns identically for everyone. However,
the bond’s illiquidity is unlike other policy tools, as it aﬀects agent types diﬀerently. It
distorts the expected returns dissimilarly across types, as 1− p  acts as a proportional
tax on liquidation, whose incidence hinges on the frequency of consumption needs.
4.5 The Eﬃcient Allocation
It is important to discuss what allocation would be selected by a planner who is
subject to the same physical constraints faced by the agents, and weights each agent
identically. Precisely, we must consider a planner that faces a sequence of static problems
of maximizing temporary utility subject to feasibility.
Recall that each agent trades with a new set of agents in every period, goods are
perishable, and at each date there is an equal number of identical buyers and sellers on
each market. It follows that the eﬃcient allocation solves a sequence of static optimization
problems directed at maximizing surplus in each market. Then, we have u (cH)=u (cL)=
1 and U (qH)=U (qL)=1so that cj = cs,j = c∗ and qj = qs,j = q∗ is optimal at each
date for j = H,L (details in the Appendix).
Clearly, policy can aﬀect economic outcomes; portfolio choices aﬀect the real balances
available in market one that in turn aﬀects the feasible trades. One naturally wonders
whether the eﬃcient allocation can be sustained when bonds pay zero yields. The reason
being, a common theoretical result indicates that selection of i =0and an appropriate
deﬂation rate–an intervention known as the Friedman rule–is the optimal course of
action. This is the ﬁrst question we look into.
5 The Failure of the Friedman Rule
We start by reporting a useful result.
Result 3. In a monetary equilibrium we must have π ≥ βH.
14Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose an equilibrium exists where π < βH. Consider
j = H in the ﬁrst line of (18). For mj > 0 we would need π ≥ βH+βH
αH
2 [u  (cH)−1] ≥ βH.
This is in contradiction with the conjecture π < βH.T h u sπ ≥ βH.
The result that an excessive rate of return on money is inconsistent with monetary
equilibrium is an obvious no-arbitrage result. It is in line with the ﬁnding of Becker
(1980) for an economy with a ﬁxed stock of capital, whose equilibrium rate of return
cannot exceed the lowest rate of time preference. Intuitively, in a monetary economy
money’s value cannot grow too fast or agents would not spend it. The key observation
here is money’s value cannot grow at a rate 1
π that is superior to the return desired–so
to speak–by the most patient agent. Setting π < βH creates an arbitrage opportunity
for the most patient agents, as the return on money exceeds their shadow interest rate
1
βH. This of course is inconsistent with equilibrium.
The implication is policy makers are constrained in their ability to give cash a return
that is suﬃciently attractive for everyone. Thus, ineﬃciencies are to be expected when
saving can only take the form of cash. To formalize this intuition we remove the incentives
to save with bonds by setting i =0 , as Friedman suggested.5 Then we ask the question:
is there any π ≥ βH that sustains the eﬃcient allocation?
Result 4. Consider i =0and π ≥ βH. A unique monetary equilibrium exists and money
holdings are heterogeneous, m∗ ≥ mH >m L > 0. The allocation is ineﬃcient.





2 [u (cj) − 1]
 





2 [u (cj)p  − 1]
 
(= if aj > 0 and ab,j =0 )
(19)
It is obvious that bonds and money are equivalent assets only if p  =1(they are inferior
otherwise). Thus, suppose p  =1and discuss money.




2 [u  (cH) − 1]
 
≥ βH .
5One way to interpret this suggestion is to realize that–from a social eﬃciency standpoint– marginal
social beneﬁts and costs of money should match. Since the private cost of holding an extra dollar is the
nominal interest rate, and money is costlessly produced, we should set i =0 . As real interest rates are
positive, Friedman suggested a deﬂation equal to the real interest rate, i.e. the unique discount factor in
a representative agent model. In our model we have more than one discount factor, but this is irrelevant,
s i n c ew eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dπ = βH is the best return money can ever give.
15If π > βH then cH <c ∗ and mH <m ∗.I fπ = βH then cH = c∗ and mH = m∗. Thus,




2 [u  (cL) − 1]
 
= βH.
Since βL < βH, it follows that cL <c ∗ and mL <m ∗. Hence, if pA =1then a unique
stationary monetary equilibrium exists in which m∗ ≥ mH >m L > 0 and c∗ ≥ cH >
cL > 0. In equilibrium limπ→+βH mH = m∗ so limπ→+βH cH = c∗;a l s o ,∂cL
∂π < 0. Thus,
the Friedman rule is a second best.
What is the intuition? When i =0eﬀectively we have a model where agents insure
against consumption shocks with money. Due to discounting disparities equilibrium re-
turns must obey the no-arbitrage restriction π ≥ βH, so the more impatient will tend
to under-insure. This leaves them liquidity constrained in market one, which creates an
ineﬃciency. Of course, setting π = βH leads to a second best (since mH = m∗).
This result seems quite robust. The Friedman rule should fail to achieve the ﬁrst
best in any model in which money has an explicit transactions role and agents ‘price’
unequally future consumption. In fact, lowering the return on bonds to that of money (by
setting i =0 ) seems to be the source of the problem. It eliminates the opportunity cost of
holding money (which is good) but it fails to provide adequate incentives for everyone to
save enough (which is bad), since π ≥ βH. Thus, we next consider a policy where i>0.
Before doing so, however, several remarks are in order.
T h eF r i e d m a nr u l ed o e sn o tf a i lt ob eaﬁrst best simply because bonds are illiquid.
Setting p  =1under i =0simply makes money and bonds indistinguishable ﬁnancial
instruments. Also, the result does not hinge on the mere existence of some arbitrary het-
erogeneity element that gives diﬀerent agents incentives to hold unequal money balances.
In fact, the Friedman rule can be quite eﬀective in eliminating equilibrium heterogeneity
in real-balances.
To see why, consider βH = βL = β, while retaining the assumption of disparities in
trade shocks, αH > αL. Set i =0so, from (19), a unique monetary equilibrium exists for









2 [u  (cL) − 1]
 
.
For π > β balances and consumption are heterogeneous, c∗ >c H >c L and m∗ >m H >
mL. Types L under-insure as they do not need cash as frequently as types H (the opposite
occurs if αH < αL). As π →+ β real balances all converge to m∗ as agents become
16indiﬀerent between having a dollar today or one tomorrow.6 In this case, trade-frequency
considerations do not enter saving decisions (see also Boel and Camera, 2004).
6 Using Bonds to Finance Consumption
We now want to demonstrate that the eﬃcient allocation can be sustained when the
bonds’ yield is positive. To simplify our task, we start by proving that such an allocation
is inconsistent with agents holding mixed portfolios.
Result 5. Consider i>0. If in equilibrium mj > 0 then cj <c ∗.
Proof.L e t i>0. We want to show that an agent who holds bonds and money in
equilibrium must be liquidity constrained.
1. We start by proving that mj <m ∗.L e taj ≥ 0. By way of contradiction, suppose
mj ≥ m∗.H e r ecj = c∗ and bonds are not liquidated. From (18), we need π = βj
for mj > 0, which implies π <
βj
pA. This is inconsistent with equilibrium as agents
would buy inﬁnite bonds. Thus, it must be that mj <m ∗ so consider 0 ≤ mj <m ∗.







2 (1 − p u (cj))
 
. Notice that if −
αj
2 (1 − p u (cj)) < 0 then π <
βj
pA.
T h i s ,h o w e v e r ,i snot inconsistent with equilibrium since fractions of bonds cannot
be liquidated. Thus, the agent would not buy inﬁnite amounts of bonds and avoid
liquidating them as (given mj =0 )his marginal utility of consumption would be
inﬁnite. Maximization requires u (cj) ≥ 1 so the agent will not buy more bonds
than necessary to acquire c∗. Hence p aj ≤ c∗.
3. Consider 0 <m j <m ∗ and suppose aj > 0. Then, using (18), the following
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2 [u (cj)p  − 1]
 
for aj >a b,j =0
βj
pA for aj = ab,j > 0
(20)
The ﬁrst line in (20) is an equality since we are conjecturing mj > 0.O n e o f t h e
other two lines must also hold with equality, since aj > 0. T h es e c o n dl i n eh o l d s
with equality, and the third with inequality, if the agents uses bonds to ﬁnance ﬁrst
6For π = β a continuum of monetary equilibria exists. The reason is price indeterminacy, as any
sequence {pt} which is consistent with pt+1/pt = β is an equilibrium.
17market consumption. The reverse is true if bonds are held until maturity. Either






[u (cj) − 1]. (21)
This no-arbitrage condition, says the net interest rate can never be so high to surpass
the expected marginal value of the ‘liquidity services’ provided by bonds,
αj
2 [u (cj)−
1]. This condition must always hold when the agent saves money. Now there are
two separate cases
(i) If (21) is an equality, then cj <c ∗ since i>0. This is independent of whether
the second line in (20) holds with a strict inequality or not. Thus, in this case
the agent has bonds and money, and he is constrained in market one.








pA. Because we are
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(22)










pA ⇒ p  ≥ 1
u (cj). (23)
This implies cj <c ∗. To see why notice that p  ≤ 1 by deﬁnition, so we need
u (cj) ≥ 1, hence cj ≤ c∗. To see why cj  = c∗ note that if cj = c∗ then we need
p  =1 . But then (22) cannot hold since we would have π = βj <
βj
pA.
We conclude that if mj,a j > 0 then cj <c ∗.T h i si st r u ew h e t h e rab,j =0or not.
Clearly, if ab,j =0then (23) must hold. The most stringent case corresponds to the
smallest u (cj),w h i c hi su (cj)=1+ 2i
αj, from (21). Thus (23) becomes p  ≥
αj
αj+2i.
Bonds cannot be too illiquid if they are used to ﬁnance market one consumption.
In short, when bonds pay a positive yield agents who hold money and bonds must be
liquidity constrained. Again, this is an arbitrage argument. In fact, suppose the agent is
unconstrained in his consumption in equilibrium. If the agent has money and bonds their
expected rates of returns must be identical. But then the agent could accumulate wealth
by holding bonds until maturity, which cannot be a stationary equilibrium.
This result suggests that perhaps the optimal policy should encourage agents to save
with bonds and not money. The government could make cash an unattractive asset–for
18saving purposes–by selecting a suﬃciently high π. Then, perhaps agents would fully
insure against consumption shocks using bonds, liquidating them when needed. In the
words of Tobin
“Why not hold transactions balances in assets with higher yields than cash,
shifting into cash only at the time an outlay must be made?” (1956, p.241)
T h ep r o b l e mw i t ht h i si st h a tt h em o s tp a t i e n ta g e n t sm i g h tw a n tt ob u yl a r g ea m o u n t s
of bonds. To see why, notice that if cj = c∗ then (18) implies
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. Our next objective is to
prove that, in certain economies, such arbitrage opportunities can be avoided in a simple
way: by making bonds suﬃciently illiquid.
6.1 The Optimal Illiquidity of Bonds







Since αH > αL then 2−αH
2−αL < 1. Thus (25) simply limits the extent of disparities in
individual discount factors. We then proceed by demonstrating that, under this condition,
the eﬃcient allocation can be achieved if bonds are suﬃciently illiquid.
Result 6. Let condition (25) be satisﬁed. If
π > βH








2 (1 − p )
 
(26)
then cj = c∗ is a stationary monetary equilibrium. Here pA,p   ∈ (0,1).
Proof. Conjecture cj = c∗. Applying our previous results we must insure that agents
save only with bonds and that bonds pay a positive yield. That is, we need mj =0 , which
requires π > βH (see the ﬁrst expression in (24)). We also need i>0 and aj >a b,j =0
(since the agent holds no money). Thus, focus on the second expression in (24), which
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. (27)















which deﬁnes uniquely pA as a function of π. Since π > βH then pA < 1 − αH
2 (1 − p ).
Thus nominal interest rates are bounded strictly away from zero.























such that (27) holds for all j. We have p  > 0 only if (25) holds, a condition we retain.
Since βH > βL and αH > αL then p  < 1. However, p  =1if βH = βL. Note also that
p  >p A if π is large.
In equilibrium aj = a for j = L,H. Since pAa =¯ m and a  = a,t h e nw eh a v e
a  = a = ¯ m
pA. Taxes are













i.e. cash at the end of the period, ¯ m, minus the payments to bond holders, ¯ m
pA, adjusted





2 +( 1− ρ)αL
2
 
. Finally, it can be proved that qk ≥ 0
if U (x) is suﬃciently larger than u (x) for x ∈ R+ (see the Appendix).
In short, when the most patient agents are also those who are more prone to con-
sumption shocks, then two elements are needed to sustain the eﬃcient allocation: savings
with bonds must be encouraged, by setting i>0 and setting π > βH, and bonds must
be illiquid, p  < 1. What is the intuition? First, we know that deﬂation cannot be too
pronounced in a monetary equilibrium, therefore the impatient agents would under-insure
by using cash. Consequently, we must give bonds a return superior to cash.
However, the patient agents would demand inﬁnite quantities of bonds if p  =1 .T h u s ,
we need to lower the return on bonds for these agents. Since types H need cash more
frequently than agents L, this can be done by setting p  < 1. When (25) holds, a unique













(1 − p )
 
.
20The equilibrium p  falls as discounting disparities increase, which is why heterogeneity in
discounting cannot be too extreme, i.e. (25).
By substituting (29) into (28), we obtain the nominal interest rate that sustains the
eﬃcient equilibrium:
1+i = π






Nominal interest rates are a function of a weighted measure of the agents’ discount factors,
θ, with weights given by the frequencies of consumption shocks.
We see that the model is consistent with the notion of existence of a ‘Fisher eﬀect,’
as i fully accounts for inﬂationary pressure, rising or falling, but leaving the allocation
unaﬀected. In particular, bonds dominate cash in rate of return, which is why no one
saves with cash. Bond yields also include a liquidity premium, captured by θ, since an
increase in the bonds’ illiquidity lessens their attractiveness. In environments where the
eﬃcient equilibrium is associated to a lower p  (hence a higher θ), we see that the bonds’







i.e. the optimal real yield converges to the (common) rate of time preference, 1
β.
7 Is the Optimal Policy Necessarily Deﬂationary?
We have seen that the availability of nominal bonds allows to sustain the eﬃcient
o u t c o m ee v e nw h e nm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi si n ﬂationary. In short, the Friedman rule is not
uniquely optimal and sometimes it is simply suboptimal. To build intuition consider the
case βH = βL = β a n ds u p p o s ew i t hh a v eb o t hm o n e ya n db o n d s .
There are two ways to sustain cj = c∗ for all j in this economy. Both hinge on the
availability of some asset that can be easily transformed into consumption, and that oﬀers
a real yield 1
β.Aﬁrst possibility is to induce agents to save with cash, insuring that cash
pays the return 1
β.T h i si sd o n eb ylowering the yield on bonds to that of money. Since
the real yield on cash is 1
π, a n do nb o n d si s1+i
π , we must set i =0 . Since cash cannot pay
interest and cannot be bought at a discount, then a deﬂation must be run at rate π = β.
Here, we are at the Friedman rule and money and bonds are perfect substitutes if p  =1 .
Alternatively, the government can give incentives to save with interest-paying bonds
that can be easily redeemed for cash. This is equivalent to setting π > β while selling
bonds at price pA =
β
π, standing ready to costlessly redeem them, i.e. setting p  =1 .
Here, agents save with bonds–not money–and obtain the real return 1
β, independent of
21π. In short, deﬂations in this environment are unnecessary for eﬃciency, as long as assets
exist that can be easily liquidated when a consumption opportunity arises.
In the absence of a ‘cash management’ technology that allows for cheap liquidation of





1 − p 
2
max(αH,αL)]
and then engage in rationing bonds’ purchases. This is reminiscent of the market for U.S.
government EE series savings bonds, which are registered illiquid bonds that cannot be
purchased in quantities that exceed a ﬁxed nominal amount (currently $60,000). We note
that this same rationing strategy would sustain an eﬃcient allocation when βH > βL but
αH ≤ αL.
8F i n a lR e m a r k s
The analysis in this paper oﬀers us two basic lessons. A ﬁrst lesson is that heterogeneity
in discounting blunts the appeal of the Friedman rule, due to equilibrium heterogeneity
in desired real balances.
Under zero interest rates, agents essentially must rely on the available stock of ﬁat
money as a means to insure against consumption risk. A simple arbitrage argument
indicates that a deﬂationary policy cannot achieve the ﬁr s tb e s t . T h er e a s o ni sc a s h
cannot promise a return greater than the discount factor of the most patient agents, much
as it happens for the return on capital in Becker (1980). Therefore, the more impatient
will under-insure, which is detrimental to eﬃciency.
Under-insurance means that in equilibrium agents hold diﬀerent amounts of the avail-
able stock of nominal assets although, unlike Becker (1980), everyone holds some. These
ﬁndings should obtain in any environment where money is essential to execute trades,
since it is simply an arbitrage argument.
A second lesson is that bonds should provide a positive yield in order to sustain
an eﬃcient equilibrium. Furthermore, under certain conditions, an additional friction is
needed: bonds should be illiquid, i.e. should be convertible into immediate consumption
less eﬃciently than cash.
In the model, this necessity stems from diﬀerence in desired rates of return and in
consumption needs. Illiquidity is a friction that removes arbitrage opportunities if the
individuals who have the lowest discount rate are also those who are more severely exposed
to consumption risk. Although this result is less general, it suggests one (more) reason as
to why illiquid government bonds might be desirable ﬁnancial instruments.
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24Appendix
Proof of qk ≥ 0
We now want to provide conditions that guarantee qk ≥ 0 in the eﬃcient equilibrium
described by Result 6. From Result 2 we have p1 = p2 = p,a n dw ek n o wq = q∗. These
results and the budget constraint (6) imply
qk = q∗ + π(m 
j + pAa 
j) − (mk,j + ak,j + τ)
In the eﬃcient equilibrium agents save only with bonds, m 
j =0 ,a n daj = a = a  for all
j.S i n c epAa =¯ m we have a  = a = ¯ m
pA. Thus
qk = q∗ +¯ mπ − (mk,j + ak,j + τ)
From now on we are going to focus on the seller’s case, since qb >q s.W e h a v e ms,j =
c∗ =
¯ mp 
pA and as,j = a = ¯ m
pA. Therefore,




p  − c∗ − c∗
p  − c∗ pA
¯ mp τ




































Since the term multiplying c∗ is greater than one, then in order to have qs > 0, q∗ must
be suﬃciently larger than c∗. Since in the eﬃcient equilibrium U (q∗)=u (c∗)=1 , then
(30) implies we need U (x) >u  (x), i.e. the marginal utility of consumption in market
two must be suﬃciently higher than the marginal utility of consumption in market one
for any amount of consumption x ∈ R+.
The Planner’s Problem
At each date the planner has buyers and sellers of identical mass 1
2[ραH+(1−ρ)αL],i n
market one, and of mass one in market two. All buyers have identical preferences and all
sellers have identical unit marginal production cost. Assuming the planner weights agents
identically it is obvious that the sellers’ marginal utilities must be identically equal to
one. Production can be assigned to sellers diﬀerently–due to ﬁxed marginal production








{ραH[u(cH) − cs,H]+( 1− ρ)αL[u(cL) − cs,L]}+ρ[U(qH)−qs,H]+(1−ρ)[U(qL)−qs,L]
subject to
ραHcH +( 1− ρ)αLcL = ραHcs,H +( 1− ρ)αLcs,L
ρqH +( 1− ρ)qL = ρqs,H +( 1− ρ)qs,L.
Here cj = cs,j = c∗ and qj = qs,j = q∗ maximizes trade surplus in market one, u(cj)−cs,j,
a n di nm a r k e tt w o ,U(qj) − qs,j.
26